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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Highly  pathogenic  avian  inﬂuenza  H5N1  has  been  a global  concern  for almost  10 years
since  its  epidemic  emergence  in  South-east  Asia in 2003/2004.  Despite  large  investment  of
resources  into  the  region,  the infection  has not  been eradicated  and  continues  to result  in
outbreaks  in  poultry  and  a small  number  of  human  fatalities.  This  review  synthesizes  the
knowledge base  generated  by  a vast  number  of  research  activities  conducted  in the  region
and  beyond,  and  adopts  an  interdisciplinary  perspective  consistent  with  the  one  health
paradigm  towards  analysing  the  problem  and  formulating  possible  policy  solutions.  A  key
outcome  of the  work  has  been  the  need  to integrate  socio-economic  and  anthropological
dimensions  with  any  disease  control  and  prevention  activities  traditionally  informed  by
primarily epidemiological,  virological  and  pathological  attributes  of  the  infection  in  poultry
and wild  waterbirds.  Recommendations  at a broad  conceptual  level  are  presented  that
acknowledge  the  diversity  in  the region  with  respect  to livestock  production,  as well  as  the
changing nature  of the  risk  landscape  as  a  consequence  of the  rapid  economic  development
which  some  of  the countries  in  the  Greater  Mekong  sub-region  are  currently  undergoing,
as well  as their  strong  trade  links  with  China  as the major  economic  power  in East  Asia.
Crown Copyright ©  2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction
Since its emergence, highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
(HPAI) subtype H5N1 has attracted considerable public
and  media attention because the virus involved has been
shown  to be capable of producing fatal disease in humans.
While there is fear that the virus may  mutate into a strain
capable of sustained human-to-human transmission, the
greatest  impact to date has been on the highly diverse poul-
try  food systems in some affected countries. In response
to  this, HPAI H5N1 control measures have focused on
implementing prevention and eradication measures in
poultry  populations, with more than 175 million birds
culled  in South-east Asia alone. The control methods used
were  based on classical approaches designed from a single
discipline, i.e. a veterinary, perspective. They primarily
involved culling, movement control and vaccination,
which have proven to be effective for dealing with small
to  medium-size outbreaks of a relatively short duration. In
the  case of HPAI H5N1, it quickly became apparent that the
infection  cannot be eradicated from South-East Asia and
China,  and therefore classical control approaches will nei-
ther  be effective nor sustainable. In order to improve local
and  global capacity for evidence-based decision making
in  the control of HPAI H5N1, inter- and intra-disciplinary
approaches need to be adopted to develop cost-effective
and efﬁcient approaches for disease risk reduction. The
current  review examines the HPAI H5N1 epidemiology
in the Greater Mekong sub-region (GMS), speciﬁcally the
region  represented by Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic
Republic (PDR), Thailand and Viet Nam, and explores
cross-disciplinary approaches to its control. A signiﬁcant
part of the evidence base considered here are the ﬁndings
from an interdisciplinary project conducted by authors of
this  review.
2.  Background on HPAI H5N1 in the Greater
Mekong sub-region
2.1.  Ecology/biology of avian inﬂuenza viruses
Avian inﬂuenza viruses (AIVs) have high mutation rates
typical  of RNA viruses (faulty transcription) resulting in
relatively  high rates of antigenic drift. In addition, due to
their  segmented genome (8 segments), genetic reassort-
ment can occur in hosts that are infected by more than
one  AIV strain, facilitating host adaptation and resulting in
high  rates of genetic shift. AIVs therefore have a compara-
tively high evolutionary capacity to adapt to new hosts and
changing  environments [1,2].AIVs representing nearly all 146 combinations of
haemagglutinin (HA) (H1–H16) and neuraminidase (NA)
(N1–N9)  have been isolated from wild waterfowl where
they cause asymptomatic infection and are considered to . .  .  . .  . . . . .  . .  . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . .  . . . .  .  . . .  .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . .  . . . .  . 317
be  endemic [3–5]. Generally, AIVs exhibit host speciﬁcity
and are easily transmitted within the aquatic environ-
ment from one waterfowl species to another through the
faecal–oral route. AIVs circulating in wild birds can spill
over  to domestic poultry, in which, initially, they are of
low  pathogenicity, causing mild respiratory disease. Non-
waterfowl wild bird species appear to play a less important
role  for virus circulation, but can still fulﬁl a function
as so-called bridge species that expose domestic poul-
try  to infection [6–9]. In the 1990s, low pathogenicity
AIVs (LPAIVs) have dramatically spread globally in domes-
tic  poultry, establishing chicken-adapted lineages. Several
major  outbreaks of avian inﬂuenza in domestic poultry due
to  H9N2 subtype occurred in the late 1990s in Germany,
Italy, Ireland, South Africa, the USA, Korea, and China.
While only few reports of HPAI in poultry are available
for the 40-year period 1950–1990, 16 incidents of distinct
HPAIV emergence have been recorded in the Americas,
Australia, Europe, South Asia and South-east Asia since
1990.  Severe epidemics have been associated with sub-
types  H5N2 in Mexico, H7N3 in Pakistan, H5N1 in China
and  beyond, H7N1 in Italy, H7N7 in Holland, and H7N3
in  Canada, heavily burdening national animal health sys-
tems  and causing massive losses to poultry industries
[7,10,11]. HPAIV H5N1 emerged in South China in 1996,
caused a major health scare in Hong Kong when the ﬁrst
human  cases of infection and death were reported in 1998,
continued to circulate and evolve in southern China for
another  5 years, and expanded to other countries in South-
east  Asia in late 2003. In a second wave of expansion in
2005/2006, HPAIV H5N1 reached Central Asia, the Middle
East,  Europe, and Africa. Despite major efforts to con-
trol  HPAIV H5N1, it is now ﬁrmly established in parts of
China,  Viet Nam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, India
and  Egypt [12]. Forty-four distinct HPAIV H5N1 geno-
types have been identiﬁed between 1996 and 2006, with
changes in dominant genotypes reﬂecting major reassort-
ment events and establishment of distinct lineages in
poultry  in different geographical regions indicating sepa-
rate  foci of endemicity [13].
2.2. Poultry sector dynamics and consumer preferences
Poultry production in the GMS  is heterogeneous in
all  its aspects, with the use of different species, different
production and marketing systems, and supports a very
diverse range of products and services. Typically, poultry
are  an integral feature of smallholder agriculture, where
the  majority of households keep a small (tens of birds)
ﬂock of ‘indigenous’, dual-purpose (meat and eggs) birds
to  meet household consumption needs, social obligations
and minor cash expenses, the latter by sales through infor-
mal,  live bird marketing channels [14–19]. This traditional,
extensive poultry production system is virtually ubiquitous
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hroughout the GMS. Comparisons produced by Rushton
t  al. [19] and by Otte et al. [17] based on various hetero-
eneous data sources in 2004–2005 suggest that extensive
oultry producers (backyard subsistence and small com-
ercial  farmers) represent over 90% of farmers and poultry
n  Cambodia and Lao PDR, about 70–80% for both in Viet
am.  In Thailand, this group also represents the vast major-
ty  of producers, but only 10% of poultry. While the data
ources for these ﬁgures vary in quality and are based
n  data from several years ago, the basic patterns are
ikely to be accurate. Simultaneously, intensive industrial
oultry production systems, which follow the production
odel developed in industrialized countries, have been
stablished particularly in Thailand where they produce
0%  of poultry, but are still uncommon in the other GMS
ountries [17,19]. These two poultry production systems
re  extremes, between which ‘hybrid’ and/or intermediate,
emi-intensive systems exist, including partial scaveng-
ng  with feed supplementation, indigenous birds crossed
ith  industrial poultry lines, partial reliance on ‘formal’
nput supply systems, but operating at intermediate scales
hundreds of birds) and relying primarily on ‘traditional’,
nformal live bird marketing networks. Each production
odel has adaptive advantages and disadvantages and
one  is likely to disappear completely. The marketing
hannels for small scale producers are varied. Small scale
roducers sell birds through ﬁve different channels: aggre-
ators,  market vendors, households and other farmers, and
estaurants. Aggregators are currently the most common
uyers [16,17,20–24].
Free-grazing duck systems are a prominent feature in
ice  paddy areas in the GMS. Primarily intended for egg
roduction, their farmers transport them intermittently
r continuously to graze in rice ﬁelds. In southern Viet
am,  particularly in the Mekong river delta, this itiner-
nt  livestock practice is widespread [25]. Free-grazing duck
ocks  (up to several thousand ducks) can travel 10–20 km
er  day, moving across commune, provincial, and even
ational borders. For the owners of rice ﬁelds, ducks offer
est  control and fertilization services, while for duck farm-
rs,  free-range grazing reduces the cost of feed by up to
0%  [26]. Consequently, free-range grazing is an essential
omponent of farmer livelihoods. These interactions are
 highly productive utilization of resources for owners of
oth  rice ﬁelds and ducks, but introduce serious animal and
ublic  health risks from an AIV perspective [16,22,27,28].
In Thailand, large-scale industrial poultry production is
ne  of the economy’s most important sources of animal-
erived food, employment, and income. This intensive,
ndustrial system is characterized by (a) being organized
y  stages of production with separate primary breeders,
ultipliers, and ﬁnishing producers (often contract farm-
rs),  (b) a small number of breeding companies dominating
he  global supply of genetic material, (c) specialization in
eat  or eggs and use of speciﬁc birds for each product,
d) use of high density feeds tailored to speciﬁc stages
nd lines of production, (e) increasing scales of production
thousands of birds) and (f) growing interconnectedness
ith the processing and agrifood marketing industries
23]. In Cambodia and Lao PDR, the ‘formal’, industrial
oultry sector occupies a minor share in national poultryogy and Infectious Diseases 36 (2013) 309– 319 311
production (about 10% of poultry meat), while the situa-
tion  in Viet Nam is intermediate between that of Thailand
and  Cambodia/Lao PDR (about a quarter of poultry meat)
[18,21,22,29,30]. In each of these emerging economies,
poultry production generally has grown faster than real
incomes  because the diet is shifting towards meat, but
industrial production has been growing faster than other
categories, driven by high levels of investment and restruc-
turing of urban food supply chains. Although the market
share of smallholder poultry production is shrinking,
market-oriented smallholder producers still outnumber
large-scale industrial production units [17].
Most grocery shopping occurs at traditional wet
markets, although that is changing in urban centres, par-
ticularly in Thailand where supermarkets are taking on a
major  role [31–35]. Wet  markets sell live and slaughtered
whole fresh local chickens, while supermarkets sell frozen
birds  and fresh cuts of industrial chickens [36]. Live birds
are  cheaper than slaughtered ones and live chickens are
preferred because customers can determine their quality
and  health. Across the region, consumers in markets with
comparable access to local and industrial birds placed a
premium  of 30–100% on the former (per kilo of rendered
meat) [22,23,37].
Consumers in different regions consistently rate safety
as  the most important attribute of poultry meat. How-
ever, while consumers are concerned about safety, they are
limited  in their ability to accurately evaluate the safety lev-
els  of the meat they purchase. Consumers that purchase live
birds  base safety considerations on the birds’ movement
and appearance while people that purchase slaughtered
birds evaluate the meat colour and texture. It was  very rare
that  anyone ranked price or taste higher than the safety
of  the product they buy [23]. Overall, the lack of knowl-
edge of the farm source was  the greatest reason for concern
about  safety, followed closely by disease risk and freshness
considerations. Although many consumers prefer the taste
of  traditional poultry varieties, most urban Thai house-
holds primarily consume industrial breeds of chicken in
part  because they place a high premium on safety [23,37].
2.3.  Household poultry keeping and marketing
Nearly all rural households in the GMS  keep poultry
for both sustenance and income, specializing in traditional
bird varieties raised in low-input systems. Smallholders
invest little to no resources in poultry production and
sales  of poultry account for only a small percentage of
household cash incomes (less than 5%). Nonetheless, the
minimal  investment in production means that the per-
centage returns are extremely high and marketing poultry
provides supplemental cash income to some of the poo-
rest  households in the region [17,23]. Because they are
a  millennial ﬁxture of rural life in the GMS, poultry are
deeply embedded in society and customs. Small ﬂocks in
and  around households reduce pest damage, provide highly
concentrated manure for direct application and compost-
ing,  and offer surveillance against predatory animals and
strangers. On a more personal level, poultry are popular
as  individual and family pets, and throughout this region
they  support an extensive, culturally important, and very
icrobiol312 D.U. Pfeiffer et al. / Comparative Immunology, M
lucrative cock ﬁghting industry. The importance of this
activity is reﬂected in the value of the most successful ﬁght-
ing  cocks, which can sell for multiples of average annual
household income. Finally, poultry are also integrated in
many  spiritual practices and festival events [38–40].
Market-oriented smallholder farmers source their
inputs (eggs, day old chicks, some feed and supplements)
from small commercial counterparts, and they are linked to
downstream markets by individual aggregators and small
poultry  product vendors in local live bird markets (LBM)
[20,23]. Aggregators reduce transactions and search cost
for  farmers, but act as monopsonists, reducing farmer bar-
gaining  power and their incentives to invest in product
quality. Aggregators also blend bird stocks and obscure
the  origin of individual birds. The former activity can
sharply increase infection risk, while the latter creates
moral hazard and adverse selection that further under-
mine the incentive for farmers to invest in larger scale
and  product quality. For their part, LBM offer a variety
of  direct beneﬁts to merchants and consumers, including
freshness, discernable product variety and quality, and tra-
ditional  food values that continue to elicit price premia in
many  GMS  markets. Whatever the share of income from
poultry, smallholder independent farmers exhibit negli-
gible  autonomous biosecurity adoption behaviour. They
will  often perceive the occurrence of disease in their ani-
mals  as a periodic and natural event [41,42]. By contrast,
most contract and large scale household producers have
adopted some form of biosecurity measures in order to con-
form  to contracts and/or protect investments undertaken.
However, large(r)-scale producers could still beneﬁt from
increased access to technical knowledge and inputs. Both
anecdotal evidence and direct observation around the GMS
reveal  extensive, diverse, and continuous transboundary
trade in poultry products, despite the fact that such trade
is  either forbidden or much more strictly circumscribed.
These ﬂows, especially of live birds and eggs, through both
kinship  and commercial networks can extend from sources
to  destinations hundreds of kilometres from border cross-
ings  [12,43].
3.  Epidemiology of HPAI in the Greater Mekong
sub-region
3.1. Spatial and temporal patterns of HPAI H5N1
occurrence
In the initial epidemic waves, HPAI H5N1 risk in
Thailand and Viet Nam was statistically associated with
duck  abundance, human population and rice cropping
intensity but less strongly with chicken numbers [44]. In
Viet  Nam, the two main HPAI H5N1 risk clusters (Red and
Mekong  river deltas) not only coincide with irrigated rice
areas  in the lowlands, but also with areas of good market
access and high poultry transaction frequency [45]. The lat-
ter  suggests that the trade network, in which LBMs fulﬁl a
key  role, facilitates spread of the virus. A striking feature of
the  different epidemic waves in Thailand and Viet Nam is
that  they did not appear to be synchronous, which raises
questions about the underlying factors that may  deﬁne ‘hot’
periods  during which increased virus circulation can beogy and Infectious Diseases 36 (2013) 309– 319
expected.  In Viet Nam, the initial epidemics occurred before
and  during the Tét holiday period when demand for poul-
try  and pork meat is particularly high, suggestive of poultry
movements as important determinants of local epidemics
[45]. In Cambodia and Lao PDR, HPAI H5N1 outbreaks
occurred sporadically, and are probably associated with
cross-border poultry trade: in the case of south-eastern
Cambodia as spillover from southern Viet Nam and in Lao
PDR  as a result of poultry trade with southern China and
northern Viet Nam. The small extent of the commercial
poultry sectors in Cambodia and Lao PDR is a possible rea-
son  for the small size of the epidemics in these countries
and endemicity is unlikely to develop due to the compar-
atively low density of poultry. Thailand experienced only
a  very small number of outbreaks between the major out-
break  waves in 2004 and 2008. These outbreaks, caused by
descendants of the original HPAIV H5N1 clades, suggested
the  existence of a local virus reservoir and are believed to
have  been associated with live poultry trade and cock ﬁght-
ing  activities of farmers. In Viet Nam, since introduction of
interventions (including large-scale vaccination campaigns
in  late 2005) outbreak incidence has been reduced signiﬁ-
cantly.  There are still small-scale epidemics around the Tét
holiday  period, but also at other times of the year. The main
foci  of infection remain in the two large river deltas, partic-
ularly  in the Mekong river delta [13,45]. Since 2008, HPAI
H5N1  incidence in Viet Nam has been about 30–70 out-
breaks per year involving single to multiple poultry ﬂocks,
up  to 10 per year in Lao PDR and Cambodia, and none have
been  reported from Thailand (data source: FAO EMPRES-
i).  This represents a major achievement considering that
in  2004 Thailand and Viet Nam had reported almost 2000
and  3000 outbreaks, respectively, which in 2005 dropped
to  about 200 and 2000, respectively. Myanmar reported
4  outbreak waves between 2006 and 2010 affecting dif-
ferent  parts of the country, which based on clade types
appeared to be epidemiologically connected with events
in  neighbouring GMS  countries [13,46].
In the Red river delta, the predominant virus clades
have changed over time while the original clade still domi-
nates  in the Mekong river delta [13]. This suggests different
mechanisms of introduction and maintenance between the
Red  river delta and Mekong river delta. Northern Viet Nam
seems  to be subject to more frequent introductions of virus
from  southern China, whereas the Mekong river delta may
have  a local reservoir of circulating virus. Mechanisms for
local  maintenance of virus presence are unclear, but are
particularly important in southern Viet Nam (and border-
ing  areas of Cambodia) since introductions from outside the
region  seem to be less common [13]. Unvaccinated ducks
have  been implicated on various occasions as the cause of
outbreaks  in that region (source: HPAI H5N1 timeline docu-
ment  on www.who.int). The area within the Mekong river
delta where the outbreaks occurred is known for a high
duck  density and large numbers of free-grazing ducks [13].
3.2.  Risk of between ﬂock transmission of HPAIV H5N1
and of transmission from poultry to humans
The likelihood of exposure of domestic poultry ﬂocks
to  HPAIV H5N1 is inﬂuenced by production system
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haracteristics and associated husbandry measures. The
ublished data describing differences in infection risk
etween poultry production types needs to be interpreted
autiously, since it is likely to be affected by reporting bias
nd  other factors compromising surveillance system sen-
itivity  [45,47–49]. Still, it is possible to identify general
pidemiological patterns on the basis of an assessment of
he  published information, as, for example, presented in
ome  detail in Fournie et al. [12]. The systems within which
oultry  are kept in the GMS  are complex. Most farming
ouseholds will keep chickens, for subsistence and many
or  cock ﬁghting, together with other agricultural produc-
ion  activities, such as rice production or aquaculture [50].
he  chickens may  be scavenging freely or be kept in small
age  enclosures, hence very limited if any bio-exclusion or
containment measures are likely to be in place [12]. Trans-
ission  of HPAIV H5N1 can occur directly through contact
etween chickens from the same as well as neighbouring
ocks, and given the large quantities of viruses excreted by
linically  diseased chickens also indirectly by contamina-
ion of clothing or equipment [51]. Since there is a high
ikelihood of HPAIV H5N1 infected chickens developing
bvious clinical signs and mortality, outbreaks will have
igniﬁcant adverse effects on farmers’ livelihoods, and in
he  absence of vaccination are highly likely to be reported.
he percentage of farmers keeping waterfowl will be high
n  areas with signiﬁcant surface water area, such in river
eltas  or around lake areas, and can then be linked to
quaculture. These systems may  be able to maintain HPAIV
5N1  without it being recognized, given that waterfowl are
ble  to carry the virus without developing clinical disease
52–57].  Subsequent to the 2003–2005 outbreak waves in
he  GMS, industrialized poultry farms, primarily chicken
arms  in Thailand, have established bio-exclusion measures
hich  have been effective at preventing introduction of
nfection,  although it needs to be acknowledged that levels
f  infection in Thailand have been very low for several years
nd  apparently zero since 2008. Considering these system
eatures, it would seem that production systems involving
aterfowl, such as in rice producing river delta areas, have
he  highest potential to maintain the virus locally, whereas
he  systems dominated by chickens produced for subsis-
ence  or small to medium scale commercial production
re likely to require introduction from elsewhere, either
hrough wild birds or through live poultry trade [58].
While wild birds in some instances might have been
ssociated with the introduction of infection into the
omestic poultry population, this source has several orders
f  magnitude lower importance for the spread and main-
enance of HPAIV H5N1 infection, compared with human
ctivities associated with domestic poultry. This conclusion
s  supported by the relatively clear trade association of the
arly  outbreak waves in Viet Nam through their occurrence
round the Tét holiday periods, and outbreak occurrence
n  northern Viet Nam along recognized trade routes (e.g.
ien  Bien Phu and several other locations along the border
etween Viet Nam and China) [45]. Also, the risk pathway
rom release of live HPAIV H5N1 by wild birds through to
xposure  of domestic poultry that then has infection as
 consequence is likely to be less effective, than any risk
athways associated with the poultry value chain.ogy and Infectious Diseases 36 (2013) 309– 319 313
The  poultry trading network has an important role in
the  spatial spread of infection. The network involves farm-
ers,  poultry traders and consumers, with the traders linking
between different farms when collecting birds as well as
through  unsold birds going back from an LBM to the home
of  the trader [24,59]. Data from Viet Nam indicate that LBMs
host  a highly dynamic population consisting of a mixture of
domestic  and occasionally wild bird species, representing
a potentially large geographic area from which birds were
sourced. Infected poultry will shed large amounts of virus,
resulting in signiﬁcant environmental contamination. It
is  therefore likely that within villages, through poultry
traders collecting birds and at live bird markets there is
a  high risk of indirect transmission through contaminated
humans or fomites. As mentioned above, infected water-
fowl  species can shed virus without necessarily progressing
to  a clinical disease stage, and therefore are likely to have
a  key role in the spread and maintenance of infection
[60–62].
Live bird markets are a key feature of the epidemiology
of HPAIV H5N1 in that they allow the mixing of birds from a
large  number of sources and of different species, including
chickens and waterfowl [63–66]. Given the likely absence
of  hygiene at most LBMs, they thereby can be seen as large
ﬂocks  that have a high turnover (daily) linked to a mul-
titude of source and target populations, and may  be able
to  maintain silent infection, without necessary occurrence
of  noticeable outbreaks [67]. This also increases the poten-
tial  for antigenic drift as well as reassortment [13]. Fighting
cocks  are ubiquitous amongst the backyard and small scale
commercial poultry producers in Thailand and other GMS
countries, and result in additional mechanisms of potential
spread of infection through movements to and from cock
ﬁghting events [58].
The  intensity of transmission of HPAIV H5N1 during the
2004  epidemic in Thailand was quantiﬁed using a basic
reproduction number R0 between 2 and 5 [68]. A transmis-
sion model for the North of Viet Nam conﬁrmed the Red
river  delta as a hotspot for sustained onward transmission
[69]. This ﬁnding is consistent with spatial cluster analy-
ses  conducted for Viet Nam which identiﬁed clusters in the
Red  and Mekong river deltas [45].
The risk of HPAIV H5N1 transmission from poultry to
humans is very low, as evidenced in the low morbidity, but
case  fatality rates are very high. Wang et al. [70] suggest
that non-fatal human cases are likely to be severely under-
reported, and that therefore current case fatality estimates
of  over 50% are too high. Exposure risk is highest amongst
producers as well as in LBMs [71,72]. Viet Nam has had
the  highest reported human cases and fatalities in the GMS
with  59 deaths and 119 cases between 2003 and 2011. Sec-
ond  is Thailand with 25 cases and 17 fatalities, followed by
18  cases and 16 fatalities in Cambodia and 2 cases and 2
fatalities  in Lao PDR (source: WHO  – January 2012). It needs
to  be emphasized that in particular the case numbers are
likely  to be an underestimate due to underdiagnosis and
underreporting.Epidemiologic investigations of human HPAI H5N1
cases have shown that transmission of HPAIV H5N1 from
poultry to humans is currently limited to individuals who
may  have been in contact with the highest potential
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concentrations of virus shed by poultry [71]. This suggests
that  there may  be a minimum level of virus concentra-
tion needed for effective transmission to occur and that
circulating HPAIV H5N1 strains have not yet mutated to
transmit  easily from poultry to human, and clearly not from
human  to human. The mode of transmission varies within
and  between countries ranging from exposure to poultry
or  poultry products during a visit to a LBM to preparing
infected poultry or swimming or bathing in ponds, which
are  frequented by poultry [71–73].
It has to be concluded that infection of humans with
HPAIV H5N1 currently is fairly unlikely, even in the absence
of  speciﬁc hygienic prevention measures. Nevertheless, any
human  case of infection apart from the high case fatal-
ity  rate, represents potential for virus reassortment that
could  produce a virus variant that is transmissible between
humans [71,74].
4.  HPAI H5N1 risk management and its impact
4.1. Driving forces of national HPAI H5N1 risk
management policy
Thailand  is one of the world’s largest poultry meat
exporters (source: FAOSTAT). Therefore, the risk manage-
ment  response of the Thai government to the emergence
of HPAI H5N1 in 2003/2004, and in particular the major
epidemic in 2004 was very much inﬂuenced by the highly
integrated intensive poultry producer stakeholder group
as  well as by the extensive publicity around the relatively
small number of human fatalities [18]. It was considered
crucial to achieve status of disease freedom as soon as
possible, and therefore during the 2004 epidemic a con-
trol  policy of large-scale culling without vaccination was
adopted  [18]. The risk management since then has been
aimed at minimizing the likelihood of reoccurrence, and
key  components have been the introduction of intensive
nationwide surveillance and of a compartmentalisation
scheme for commercial poultry farms. The inﬂuence of
backyard and small-scale chicken as well as duck farmers
appears to have been much less signiﬁcant, as has been that
of  cockﬁghting enthusiasts which represent a large part of
rural  communities [18].
In  Viet Nam, policy development at national level is
driven by state actors, i.e. the Vietnamese Communist party
with  a weak link to other sections of society, particularly
with farmers who represent 70% of the population [30].
Furthermore, the effectiveness of policy implementation
at central government level is compromised by the rela-
tive  independence of local authorities [30]. This situation
results in different control policies between provinces or
districts,  such as for example different levels of compen-
sation between provinces [75]. Signiﬁcant introductions of
foreign  aid also had a strong inﬂuence on policy develop-
ment [30]. While the occurrence of HPAI H5N1 had not
been  acknowledged by the Vietnamese authorities until the
beginning  of 2004, from then on its control was given high
priority,  such that between 2005 and 2006 the Vietnamese
government spent US $266 million on avian inﬂuenza con-
trol  [18]. The occurrence of the epidemic with at the time
the  highest number of reported human fatalities and theogy and Infectious Diseases 36 (2013) 309– 319
associated  media reaction also resulted in rural and primi-
tive  farming practices being blamed for it [39,75]. The key
difference in the control strategy compared with Thailand
was  the use of large-scale vaccination. In Vietnam, 65%
of  poultry producers were smallholder free-range systems
which  contributed 60–70% of all chickens sold per year.
Industrial farming systems produced 18–20% of chickens,
but  only represented 0.1% of all poultry farms [16]. Vietnam
does  not have signiﬁcant live poultry and associated prod-
ucts  exports. As a consequence of this poultry production
system structure, the industry stakeholders had relatively
little  inﬂuence on the policy response [30,76].
Both, Lao PDR and Cambodia only reported a very
small number of outbreaks during the major epidemics in
2004/2005  within the GMS. They have low poultry den-
sity,  and their policy response was  strongly inﬂuenced by
foreign  aid and inﬂuence, largely due to poor animal and
human  health infrastructures [14,29].
4.2. National control measures and their efﬁcacy
All GMS  countries considered in this review engaged in
promoting improved biosecurity at farm level as a method
for  preventing introduction of infection to poultry ﬂocks.
The  speciﬁc approaches were broadly consistent with rec-
ommendations made by international organizations [77].
But  as discussed by Cristalli and Capua [78], the incentives
for  promotion or adoption varied signiﬁcantly between
countries, with Thailand having achieved the highest level
of  awareness, and Cambodia and Lao PDR the lowest.
In  Thailand, measures adopted for disease containment
adhered closely to provisions laid out by FAO, WHO  and
OIE.  These included a comprehensive cull of all suscep-
tible poultry from farms located within a 5-km radius.
Compensation was among the highest paid in South-east-
Asia. Movement restrictions were imposed within a 50-km
radius  of outbreak locations. A 90-day ban imposed on
export  of poultry from affected areas, redundant to pro-
hibitions from other countries [47]. From mid-2004, due to
the  reduction in outbreaks achieved by the disease contain-
ment  policy, it was possible to focus on large-scale active
surveillance involving diagnostic assessment of very large
numbers  of samples collected from farms, as well as in
relation to movements and slaughter. Any outbreaks were
controlled using culling within zones of only 1-km radius.
Information campaigns were implemented in relation to
human  health protection and poultry biosecurity [18,79].
To  speciﬁcally protect industrial poultry farms from infec-
tion  through exposure to potential presence of infection
in  backyard and small-scale commercial production sys-
tems,  a government-funded scheme was  implemented that
involved  establishment of disease-free compartments sur-
rounding  some industrial poultry farms. The biosecurity
protocol involves intensive surveillance for infection in a
2-km  buffer zone around the compartmentalized farms, as
well  as other measures [79,80].
Viet Nam implemented a wide range of control meas-
ures, including large-scale culling, movement controls and
closure  of live poultry markets, banning poultry keeping
in  some major cities, campaigns to educate the pub-
lic  about preventive measures. The culling policy was
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evised after the ﬁrst epidemic wave (44 million birds
ulled) as it became clear that extensive culling based
n  pre-established geographic criteria (i.e. 1-km radius
ing  culling) was too expensive and hard to perform
iven that farmers were not willing to give up appar-
ntly healthy birds [30]. In addition to the direct cost of
ulling,  farmers demanded compensation, which repre-
ented a major ﬁscal burden. In subsequent waves, targeted
ulling  of high-risk bird populations immediately adjacent
o  infected farms was employed, dramatically reducing the
umber  of birds culled. From 2005 onwards, Viet Nam
aunched comprehensive, nationwide vaccination cam-
aigns  for all birds, to a large extent funded by donors
30]. Vaccination coverage achieved by the mass vaccina-
ion  campaigns was at best moderate [69]. Although the
ithin-ﬂock basic reproduction number of infection (R0)
as  been signiﬁcantly reduced in the fourth epidemic wave
vaccination-based control policy) when compared to the
econd  epidemic wave (depopulation-based control pol-
cy),  the mean within-ﬂock R0 of the fourth epidemic wave
as  still not signiﬁcantly below unity, suggesting problems
ith  obtaining the required vaccination coverage within
ome  ﬂocks [81,82].
Cambodia’s control policy involves poultry movement
estrictions and permitted culling of infected ﬂocks with-
ut  compensation. Also, 3-km protection zones and 10-km
urveillance zones were established around outbreaks
15,29]. Temporary suspension of sales and purchases of
irds  was mandated. However, law enforcement is weak
nd  compliance is low [15,29].
Experience from Viet Nam (and also China) has shown
hat large-scale vaccination does not eliminate infection
13,81,83,84]. Overall, control measures in place during the
007  wave of outbreaks in Viet Nam reduced the number
f  communes capable of spreading infection by an esti-
ated  11%. This was achieved at a far lower social and
conomic cost than during previous waves. However these
ains  have to be balanced against the cost of maintaining
evels of effective vaccination protection in an endemic sit-
ation  [83]. As estimates suggest that the infectious period
t  population level has increased following vaccination, the
mpact  of waning levels of immunity as the initial impetus
o  vaccinate is lost, coupled with the effects these changes
ay  have upon the ability to detect outbreaks, remains an
ssue  which needs to be addressed [69]. On the other hand,
 control strategy without vaccination involving a combi-
ation  of activities including intensive surveillance such as
racticed  in Thailand around compartmentalized poultry
roduction units appears to be able to eliminate infection,
nd  apparently prevent outbreaks of disease [13].
An  important aspect of effective prevention of spread
n  the event of outbreaks is their early detection, as has
een  demonstrated by mathematical models [69]. The most
ost-effective mechanism for achieving this goal will be
o  incentivise farmers to report any suspect cases and for
he  animal health authorities to be able to react quickly.
 generic set of guidelines for on-farm biosecurity has
een  published by the Food and Agriculture Organization
f the United Nations (FAO), and local stakeholders will
mplement adaptations of these which are relevant in their
peciﬁc  context [36,77]. It is important to recognize thatogy and Infectious Diseases 36 (2013) 309– 319 315
biosecurity does not come in ‘black or white’ but in shades
of  grey. It is incremental, i.e. one measure can be put on
top  of another, and sensibly should address the biggest
risk(s) ﬁrst. This, however, means that biosecurity is to a
large  extent context-speciﬁc and, although in qualitative
terms it is known how HPAIV H5N1 may  spread, there is
only  limited quantitative data on the relative importance of
different  pathways of infection in different production sys-
tems.  As all investments, investing in biosecurity is subject
to  the law of diminishing returns and it is neither eco-
nomically efﬁcient, nor biologically feasible, to reach 100%
biosecurity. For privately funded investment in biosecu-
rity  the beneﬁt to the individual needs to at least cover
the  cost over the lifetime of the investment. Given that
investing in biosecurity has a ﬁxed cost component, cost
per  bird protected will be lower for larger production units
than  for smaller production units, hence economic incen-
tives  differ by scale of production (in addition to the fact
that  larger ﬂocks may  have more transactions and therefore
often  more risky contacts than small ﬂocks). Consequently,
smallholder behaviour of limited investment into biose-
curity  is economically rational. Therefore, approaches to
disease  control need to be congruent with local social,
cultural, economic and political realities [41,42]. Policies
aimed at behaviour change which should be to HPAI H5N1
control,  need to build on an understanding of existing
behaviour, as the latter is likely to have very solid foun-
dations, otherwise they are likely to fail. Biosecurity ‘kills
several  birds with one stone’ and returns at the beginning
of  the ‘biosecurity function’ are high. If context-speciﬁc
(i.e. proven to work and not requiring radical changes in a
given  environment and production system), the introduc-
tion/improvement of biosecurity is potentially pro-poor
rather than anti-poor, provided producers have access to
the  required capital and knowledge, and are given sufﬁ-
cient  time and support to adapt.
4.3. Livelihoods and economic impacts of HPAI H5N1
disease and control
HPAI  H5N1 affects animal production via three main
pathways. Firstly, it causes direct losses to producers and
other  actors connected to the production and marketing
of poultry through morbidity and mortality and the pri-
vate  costs associated with ex ante risk mitigation or ex post
coping  measures and the need to reinvest in replacement
birds. Second, HPAI H5N1 has severe impacts through gov-
ernment  intervention, which carries a cost borne by the
public  at large and affects producers and associated up-
and  downstream actors. Thirdly, HPAI H5N1 impacts arise
through  demand shocks created by consumer fears of con-
tracting  the disease. In concert, these impacts can lead to
irreversible industry readjustments.
On  a national scale, direct poultry losses from HPAI
H5N1 disease and related culling were minor in Cambodia
and  Lao PDR, while both in Thailand and Viet Nam some 60
million  birds were culled during the initial waves in 2004,
which  at the time represented between 20 and 30% of the
standing  poultry population [17,85]. Compensation pay-
ments  and other public mitigation measures implemented
by the respective governments transferred some of the
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ﬁnancial burden from the private to the public sector [86].
Apart  from direct losses, movement restrictions, market-
ing  bans and consumer reluctance to purchase poultry and
poultry  products led to a severe drop in activity throughout
the  entire market-oriented sector of the poultry industry
in  the GMS, affecting feed producers, traders, processors
and retailers (not eligible for compensation). The economic
downturn of the poultry sector was partially compensated
by increasing activity and prices in sectors producing sub-
stitute  food products [17,37].
The industrial/corporate poultry sector has adapted to
HPAI  H5N1 by exerting increasing control over every stage
of  production and raising sanitary standards [17,87,88].
The high costs required to build the necessary infrastruc-
ture and difﬁculty of securing loans without collateral,
make it unlikely that low-income households would be
able  to enter into any stage of industrial poultry produc-
tion. Even farmers that presently have contracts may  have
difﬁculty  adapting to the highly competitive conditions
if  they are required to make expensive upgrades to farm
infrastructure. The high ﬁxed costs of processing, con-
trolled primarily by the integrators, pose another barrier
prohibiting entry of independent farms into the system.
Additionally, in Thailand, because of export orientation,
processing plays an increasingly important role in the
organization of poultry production [17,23]. Collectively,
small-scale subsistence-oriented poultry keepers suffered
the  largest cumulative economic losses from HPAI H5N1
disease  and control in the GMS  while the disease posed
the  highest livelihoods threat to market-oriented poultry
producers and market agents (in their majority usually rel-
atively  small-scale enterprises) specialized in poultry. The
reason  for this discrepancy is that the latter only represent
a  minority of producers, but a minority whose livelihoods
are most affected by longer lasting HPAI H5N1 outbreaks
and/or protracted control measures due to their relatively
high  investments and specialization in poultry [17].
4.4.  Alternative approaches to HPAI H5N1 control
Animal diseases are part and parcel of farmers’ every-
day experience and local responses are determined at least
as  much by local cultural as by imposed technical ratio-
nales. There is a direct link between the perceived value of
poultry  and the optimum disease management approach
from an individual farmer’s perspective. Higher valuation
of  live poultry will increase the care taken, possibly enhanc-
ing  monitoring efforts and thereby reducing the culling
radius. Enhancing the value of poultry, via improved mar-
keting  and safety, would ultimately result in less drastic
HPAI  H5N1 control policies. Numerically, small farmers
and enterprises dominate the market populations across
GMS  agrifood systems. These networks confer livelihoods
on  such low income agents only because the costs of partic-
ipation  are very low. If control measures impose signiﬁcant
additional costs on the operations of any category of par-
ticipation in these markets, they will be forced out quickly
[37].  Moreover, because of low savings and the need to
re-commit to some other livelihood activity, displacement
like this can be irreversible. By promoting risk sharing sup-
ply  chain relationships, such as contracting, certiﬁcation,ogy and Infectious Diseases 36 (2013) 309– 319
and traceability, individual agents can contribute to a
local  commons of lower disease risk, more credible prod-
uct  quality, and higher value added across low income
networks extending from farmers to consumer households.
In  these circumstances, every value chain participant has
a  shared interest in more diligent safety production, dis-
tribution, and marketing practices. Such virtuous cycles of
value  creation/sharing can overcome endemic problems
of  moral hazard and adverse selection [22,23]. Based on
a  simple statistical value of life calculation, the gain from
reduced pandemic risk is in the billions of dollars, annually
[89].  The private sector is unlikely to invest optimally in
development of improved surveillance and risk reduction
measures. Therefore, development of disease surveillance
technologies has a global public good element, and their
development should be supported by public sources. To
deal  with distributional issues within and across countries
and  regions, a regime of penalties should be accompanied
by ﬁxed transfers, including from third countries which
beneﬁt from reduced disease risk.
5. Conclusions
The HPAI H5N1 situation in the GMS  countries illus-
trates the importance for adopting an interdisciplinary
(or one health) approach towards risk assessment and
management when dealing with disease problems. The
countries are diverse across all aspects relevant to ani-
mal  disease control, including the role of agriculture in
the  overall economy, livestock sector and market structure,
individual and societal risk perceptions related to liveli-
hoods  and public health, national and local governance
systems. This diversity limits the generality of national
solutions and poses a challenge to multilateral coordina-
tion. Standard disease response prescriptions that populate
international guidelines and are replicated in country plans
assume  well-functioning human and animal health sys-
tems,  rapid and efﬁcient response capacity, and up-to-date
epidemiological information and technical expertise, none
of  which prevail in most GMS  countries. Technocratic,
expert-driven, top-down solutions falter in the face of
bureaucratic and political complexity, institutional weak-
ness,  and local market imperfections.
Diseases can be controlled and even eradicated with-
out  having to reduce transmission risk to ZERO. To be cost
effective, control measures should ﬁrst be applied to the
highest  risk groups/areas/activities and proceed down the
risk  hierarchy as resources allow and aggregate risk neces-
sitates.  Disease control authorities need to recognize that
the  risk of livestock disease is a combined result of bio-
logical processes and economic as well as social behaviour
extending across the entire agrifood sector, including live-
stock  keepers, their input suppliers, their downstream
market partners, and of agents within the animal and
public health system itself. ‘Conventional’ disease control
strategies, emphasizing public surveillance and economic
sanctions, present signiﬁcant long-term ﬁscal obligations
and adverse incentive problems.
In the short term it will be impossible to eradicate
HPAI H5N1 infection from the region. It is entirely feasible,
however, to reduce rates of transmission to a degree that
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orestalls development of local reservoirs of infection and
etects  incursions before they have spread ‘out of control’.
argeted control measures, such as reducing infection risks
t  LBMs, as well as prevention measures aimed at domestic
uck  production, would make important contributions to
his  ‘second-best’ objective. Transboundary HPAI H5N1
ransmission risk within the GMS  appears to be high and
hailand, Lao PDR, and Viet Nam are exposed to HPAIV
ntroductions from southern China. In this setting, national
nd  international resources for domestic eradication will
ot  achieve their objectives, suggesting an urgent need for
ore  determined multilateral policy coordination [13].
Poultry  are rarely the primary source of income for rural
ouseholds, and within the household level or small scale
oultry  ‘enterprise’, HPAI H5N1 is not normally the disease
f  primary concern. If this disease is seen as exceptional by
ther  stakeholders, emergency responses need to commu-
icate  this with meaningful development responses that
eward  smallholders for internalizing national or global
ealth risks. Unfortunately, these two ‘response modal-
ties’  are decoupled both at international and national
evels.
In  the context of emergency response, risk manage-
ent of HPAI H5N1 has not been integrated with other
oultry or livestock disease issues, even though these may
atter  more to the smallholders. Support for producer
diversiﬁcation’ and quality improvements appear a more
romising tool for HPAI H5N1 risk reduction than targeted
ompensation for stock losses. The same reasoning applies
o  production and trade bans, which cannot be enforced
nd may  make matters worse.
HPAIV H5N1 now appears to be endemic in parts of
he  GMS  and domestic and (especially) external public
esources for control measures will be difﬁcult to sus-
ain  at previous levels [13]. Attempting to improve the
iosecurity of millions of backyard producers is an inef-
ective  use of scarce resources, especially through public
unds  in countries with many high development priorities.
ublicly funded, routine large-scale vaccination campaigns
re  costly and appear to be inefﬁcient [90]. Targeted
accination of speciﬁc high-risk groups can achieve com-
arable  risk reduction at a fraction of the cost [83]. For
ithin-country areas with apparent endemic infection
e.g. Mekong delta in Viet Nam), eradication programmes
hould be considered, but carefully targeted at the mecha-
isms  responsible for maintenance of infection. Hygiene
nd  diagnostic effectiveness needs to be improved in
BMs  and associated value chains. These include poultry
rade networks (e.g. allow movement in one direction –
ownstream; limit distance travelled), live bird markets
rest days, species segregation) and targeted duck surveil-
ance,  including accreditation of infection-free duck farms.
stablishment of infection-free zones or compartments
s possible, as has been demonstrated by Thailand, and
an  be used as ‘success stories’ and technology incu-
ators. Economic outcomes for these groups may  also
nduce emulation/adoption elsewhere. Cross-border trade,
articularly with southern China, is an important mech-
nism for recurrent introduction of infection to the GMS
egion.  This risk needs to be managed, or national erad-
cation programmes will be futile. Simple prohibitions of
[ogy and Infectious Diseases 36 (2013) 309– 319 317
cross-border  trade are ineffective and create informal ﬂows
that  make infection processes unobservable. The only prac-
tical  solution is multilateral coordination to effectively
monitor ﬂows of animals, products, and infrastructure.
Reducing virus prevalence in poultry will signiﬁcantly
reduce the risk of humans to become infected, and this can
be  further reduced by public education campaigns limiting
high  risk behaviour.
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